9/11 15th anniversary September 11, 2016, Clinton administration most responsible, Citizen Wells proof, Bill Clinton multiple opportunities to capture Bin Ladin, INS weakened by Clinton political agenda, Government and country immersed in scandals and prosecutions
“As I stated earlier, this is not about sex or private conduct, it is about multiple obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, witness tamperings and abuses of power, all committed or orchestrated by the President of the United States.”…David Schippers report to House Judiciary Committee
“August 1998: covert operations limited to a ‘capture operation,’ not kill
As will be shown, Clinton vacillated over signing a memo that would authorize the killing of bin Laden. He first authorized only a capture, then agreed to allow bin Laden’s killing, only to weaken the language later. CIA officials were under the impression they did not have permission to kill the al-Qaeda leader.”…Washington Post February 16, 2016
“I could have killed’ Osama bin Laden in 1998”…Bill Clinton
After reading the below, if you do not believe that the Clinton Administration is the most responsible for 9/11, you are some combination of the following:
1. Dim witted.
2. Hard core end justifies the means liberal.
3. Anti American.
Part 1
Clinton had multiple opportunities to capture Bin Ladin.
From NewsMax November 1, 2001 via Citizen News.
“CIA Sources: Clinton Administration ‘Didn’t Want’ Bin Laden Arrested”
“A U.S. intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, this week called the Clinton administration’s decision to pass up a chance to arrest Osama bin Laden in 1996 a “disgrace,” saying “somebody didn’t want this to happen.”
A second intelligence official, also speaking anonymously, corroborated the charge that there was a deliberate effort to let bin Laden escape from the Sudan to Afghanistan, saying “somebody let this slip up.”
The intelligence officials, both of whom were involved in secret negotiations between Washington and Khartoum to take bin Laden into custody, offered the damning accounts to New York’s Village Voice.
The Voice’s first source said the chance to arrest bin Laden should have been a no-brainer, despite FBI claims that it lacked the evidence to convict him in an American court. “We kidnap minor drug czars and bring them back in burlap bags,” he told the paper.
The State Department may have blocked the wily terrorist’s arrest to placate a part of the Saudi Arabian government that supported him, he speculated.
The second official lamented that the U.S. lost a treasure trove of intelligence on the elusive al-Qaeda chief when it let him slip away. “It was not a matter of arresting bin Laden but of access to information,” he told the Voice.
“We could have dismantled his operations and put a cage on top … That’s the story, and that’s what could have prevented September 11. I knew it would come back to haunt us.”
Sudan’s former defense minister, major general Elfatih Erwa, agreed, telling the paper that he tried to warn the Clinton administration that letting bin Laden escape from the Sudan to Afghanistan was a major blunder.
“We knew that if he went to Afghanistan no one could control him (but) the U.S. didn’t care,” Erwa said. “They forgot about human intelligence after the Cold War. The feeling of supremacy led them astray. Many think that. Now they’re harvesting the thorns.”
From the LA Times August 1, 2014.
“Bill Clinton: ‘I could have killed’ Osama bin Laden in 1998”
“A day before Sept. 11, 2001, former President Bill Clinton told an audience that he could have had Osama bin Laden killed, but chose not to, because an attack could have endangered innocent women and children in Afghanistan.”
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-bill-clinton-osama-bin-laden-20140801-story.html
Citizen Wells comments:
- What was Bill Clinton and his staff busy doing in 1998? If you don’t know the answer you had better start reading this site.
- This sounds like damage control because Clinton had many opportunities. See below.
From the Washington Post February 16, 2016.
“Bill Clinton and the missed opportunities to kill Osama bin Laden”
“1. May 1998: Tarnak Farms raid plan rejected
The CIA planned hard on an effort to capture bin Laden and to bring him to the United States for a trial. But at the last minute the CIA senior management lost its nerve and apparently never brought the plan to Clinton for a decision.”
“2. August, 1998: A campaign for continued air strikes is shelved after al-Qaeda attacks two U.S. embassies in Africa
After the embassy attacks, Clinton ordered air strikes against al-Qaeda targets, which were deemed ineffectual. Officials discussed but do not reach agreement on a campaign of follow-on air strikes.”
“3. August 1998: covert operations limited to a ‘capture operation,’ not kill
As will be shown, Clinton vacillated over signing a memo that would authorize the killing of bin Laden. He first authorized only a capture, then agreed to allow bin Laden’s killing, only to weaken the language later. CIA officials were under the impression they did not have permission to kill the al-Qaeda leader.”
“4. December 1998: Missile strike against Kandahar is rejected; memo to ‘kill’ bin Laden misunderstood
Officials had intelligence on bin Laden’s whereabouts, but decided not to allow a missile strike because of fears of civilian casualties. Later intelligence indicates bin Laden had already left that location.”
“5. Early 1999: Decision not to deploy the AC-130 gunship option
From the 9/11 Commission report:
After the decision — in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor — not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as “Spooky” can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving [White House official Richard] Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden’s headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft.”
“Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed.”
“6. February-March 1999: A decision not to strike bin Laden’s desert camp
Another potential target — bin Laden’s desert camp — slips by because of diplomatic considerations.
From the 9/11 Commission report:”
“No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Laden had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot. According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Laden or close by. … The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable; the Bin Laden unit chief, “Mike,” agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Laden before 9/11.”
“7. February 1999: The decision to again amend the covert action authorization, canceling the ‘kill’ authorization of December and reinstating the ‘capture’ language
From the 9/11 Commission report:
In February 1999, another draft Memorandum of Notification went to President Clinton. It asked him to allow the CIA to give exactly the same guidance to the Northern Alliance as had just been given to the tribals: they could kill Bin Laden if a successful capture operation was not feasible. On this occasion, however, President Clinton crossed out key language he had approved in December and inserted more ambiguous language. No one we interviewed could shed light on why the President did this. President Clinton told the Commission that he had no recollection of why he rewrote the language.
Later in 1999, when legal authority was needed for enlisting still other collaborators and for covering a wider set of contingencies, the lawyers returned to the language used in August 1998, which authorized force only in the context of a capture operation. Given the closely held character of the document approved in December 1998, and the subsequent return to the earlier language, it is possible to understand how the former White House officials and the CIA officials might disagree as to whether the CIA was ever authorized by the President to kill Bin Laden.”
“8. May 1999: The decision not to do the missile strike on Kandahar
Another opportunity presents itself, and top officials again do not pull the trigger, to the intense frustration of lower-level officials.
It was in Kandahar that perhaps the last, and most likely the best, opportunity arose for targeting Bin Laden with cruise missiles before 9/11. In May 1999, CIA assets in Afghanistan reported on Bin Laden’s location in and around Kandahar over the course of five days and nights. The reporting was very detailed and came from several sources.
If this intelligence was not “actionable,” working-level officials said at the time and today, it was hard for them to imagine how any intelligence on Bin Laden in Afghanistan would meet the standard. Communications were good, and the cruise missiles were ready. “This was in our strike zone,” a senior military officer said. “It was a fat pitch, a home run.” He expected the missiles to fly. When the decision came back that they should stand down, not shoot, the officer said, “we all just slumped.” He told us he knew of no one at the Pentagon or the CIA who thought it was a bad gamble. Bin Laden “should have been a dead man” that night, he said.”
“9. November-December 2000: The decision not to strike against bin Laden after the al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole
As the nation is gripped by the post-election struggle between Bush and Al Gore, Clinton administration officials hesitate about retaliating against bin Laden for the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. Bin Laden was fully prepared for retaliation, but it never came. Eventually, a response gets lost in the transition from the Clinton to Bush administration.”
“[No attack was launched and one angry official] rhetorically asked of Defense officials: “Does al-Qaeda have to attack the Pentagon to get their attention?””
Read more:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/02/16/bill-clinton-and-the-missed-opportunities-to-kill-osama-bin-laden/
Part 2
INS effectiveness weakened due to political agenda demands of Clinton Administration.
David Schippers was the majority chief investigative counsel for the impeachment of Bill Clinton. He was also a lifetime Democrat and voted for Clinton twice.
From Schippers and his book “Sellout: The Inside Story of President Clinton’s Impeachment.”
“My staff and I agreed that we needed to focus on the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which appeared to be running out of control. By the time we came to the subject, investigations by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and congressional committees had already indicated that the White House used the INS to further its political agenda. A blatant politicization of the agency took place during the 1996 presidential campaign when the White House pressured the INS into expediting its “Citizenship USA” (CUSA) program to grant citizenship to thousands of aliens that the White House counted as likely Democratic voters. To ensure maximum impact, the INS concentrated on aliens in key states — California, Florida, Illinois, New York, New Jersey, and Texas — that hold a combined 181 electoral votes, just 89 short of the total needed to win the election.
The program was placed under the direction of Vice President Al Gore. We received from the GAO a few e-mails indicating Vice President Gore’s role in the plan (which are included in Appendix A at the back of the book). He was responsible for keeping the pressure on, to make sure the aliens were pushed through by September 1, the last day to register for the presidential election.”
“Farbrother and the NPR won the assignment of getting the INS to process more than a million applicants by the end of the summer. As early as March 1996, GAO documents reveal, he was reporting his efforts, recommendations, and results to Vice President Gore. Farbrother reported how he had told the INS and the Justice Department to waive “stupid rules,” and he told Gore that unless reforms were implemented, the backlog wouldn’t be “processed in time.”
As Farbrother noted in a March 22 e-mail to Gore, he had told INS Deputy Commissioner Chris Sale and Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick “to delegate broad authority to the managers in” New York, Chicago, Miami, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. But the INS and the Justice Department were not immediately complying with his demands, he said. Keeping the pressure on, Farbrother sent Sale a fax reiterating how important this delegation was in order “to get the results the Vice President wants.” In the fax he also commented, “I need you or Doris [Meissner] to sign something like the attached,” referring to a memo giving those INS district directors “full authority to waive, suspend, or deviate from DOJ and INS nonstatutory policies, regulations, and procedures provided you operate within the confines of the law.”
The White House wanted any applicant for citizenship to be naturalized in time to register for the November election, so the pressure on the INS was constant. On March 21 Elaine Kamarck in the Vice President’s office sent an e-mail to Farbrother saying: “THE PRESIDENT IS SICK OF THIS AND WANTS ACTION. IF NOTHING MOVES TODAY WE’LL HAVE TO TAKE SOME PRETTY DRASTIC MEASURES.” Farbrother responded, “I favor drastic measures.” If he couldn’t get what he wanted from the INS, he wrote, he would “call for heavy artillery.””
Read more:
http://cis.org/BookReview-InsideStoryClintonImpeachment
Clearly the priority of the INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service, was to naturalize as many immigrants as possible befoer the next election.
Next we will examine the immigration status of the 9/11 hijackers.
From FAIR, Federation for American Immigration Reform.
“Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists
“According to authorities, all of the hijackers who committed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were foreigners. All of them entered the country legally on a temporary visa, mostly tourist visas with entry permits for six months. Although four of them attended flight school in the United States, only one is known to have entered on an appropriate visa for such study, and one entered on an F-1 student visa. Besides the four pilots, all but one of the terrorists entered the United States only once and had been in the country for only three to five months before the attacks.
The four pilots had been in the United States for extended periods, although none was a legal permanent resident. Some had received more than one temporary visa, most of which were currently valid on September 11, but at least three of them had fallen out of status and were, therefore, in the United States illegally.”
The Pentagon Plane (AA Flight 77, Dulles to Los Angeles)
- Hani Hasan Hanjour (26) — Saudi Arabian — pilot
- First came to U.S. in Oct. 1991 to study English in Tucson, Arizona.
- Had been in U.S. in April 1996, when he lived in Oakland, Cal. where he studied English, and later received flight training in Scottsdale, Arizona. He left in Nov. 1996 and returned again in Nov. 1997 while he obtained a FAA commercial pilot certificate. He left again in April 1999.
- Obtained student visa (F-1) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in Sept. 2000 after an initial refusal. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Hanjour failed to reveal in his visa application that he had previously traveled to the United States.
- Returned Dec. 2000 to study English at Holy Names College (Oakland CA) but never showed up at the school. In illegal status because he did not enroll, and his entry permit had expired at the time of the attack.
- Lived in San Diego, Phoenix and Mesa, Ariz. (with Nawaf al-Hamzi), and later in Northern Virginia.
- Had a Virginia driver’s license.
- Khalid al-Mihdhar (or Almidhar) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained U.S. tourist visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in April 1999.
- In Malaysia in Jan. 2000. Followed by Malaysian agents tipped off by CIA (see Wash. Post 2/3/02).
- Arrived at Los Angeles Jan. 15, 2000 with Nawaf al-Hamzi on B-2 tourist visa from Malaysia.
- Lived in San Diego, where he took flight training in May 2000 with Nawaf al-Hamzi.
- Left U.S. in June 2000 and obtained new B-1 visa in Saudi Arabia. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, his application falsely indicated he had not previously traveled to the United States and contained “suspicious indicators.” It also revealed that he had more than one passport.
- Returned July 4, 2001, lived in New York.
- Put on the Watch List for terrorists in August 2001 after entering U.S. last time.
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Had a Virginia driver’s license.
- Nawaf al-Hamzi (or Alhamzi) — Saudi Arabian (brother of Salem)
- Obtained U.S. tourist visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in April 1999. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, his application contained “suspicious indicators.”
- In Malaysia in Jan. 2000. Followed by Malaysian agents tipped off by CIA (see Wash. Post 2/3/02).
- Arrived at Los Angeles Jan. 15, 2000 with al-Midhar from Malaysia.
- Lived in San Diego, where he took flight training in May 2000 with al-Midhar, in Dec. 2000 moved to Mesa Arizona (with Hani Hanjour), and later to Fort Lee, N.J., Wayne, N.J. and Northern Virginia.
- Applied to INS July 12, 2000 for extension of permitted stay in U.S. (apparently granted for additional six months).
- Put on the Watch List for terrorists in August 2001. (with al-Mihdhar)
- Had been in illegal visa overstay status for nine months at the time of the attack.
- Had California, Florida and Virgina driver’s licenses.
- Salem al-Hamzi (or Alhamzi)- Saudi Arabian (brother of Nawaf)
- Obtained U.S. tourist visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in April 1999.
- Arrived U.S. June 2001.
- Lived in Fort Lee, N.J., Wayne, N.J.
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Had a Virginia driver’s license.
- Majed Moqed — Saudi Arabian
- Identity in doubt.
- Entered on tourist visa obtained in Saudi Arabia after May 2001.
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Had a Virginia driver’s license.
The WTC North Tower Plane (AA Flight 11, Boston to Los Angeles)
- Mohamed Atta — Egyptian (43) — pilot
- Born in Egypt in 1968.
- Graduated from Cairo Univ. with degree in Architectural Engineering in 1990.
- Obtained visitor visa in Berlin Germany, May 2000.
- Entered U.S. at Newark on June 3, 2000 on tourist visa and given entry permit until December 2, 2000.
- Applied in Sept. 2000 to INS for change in status to trainee.
- Attended Huffman Aviation school in Venice Florida with al-Shehhi.
- Arrested in Florida for driving without license, and failed to show up for court date — bench warrant issued.
- Subsequently obtained Florida driver’s license.
- Obtained FAA pilot’s certificate.
- According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, had overstayed his entry permit as of Dec. 4, 2000.
- Flew to Madrid Jan. 2001.
- United Arab Emirate (UAE) authorities state Atta detained in January 2001 on basis of his name appearing on terrorist alert list, but was not held in absence of U.S. charges. UAE states that U.S. authorities were warned Atta intended to return to U.S.
- Returned to U.S. on January 10, 2001 at Miami and was sent to secondary inspection because he acknowledged being in flight training but did not have required trainee visa. Interagency Border Information System (IBIS) database checked. Admitted by INS based on pending application for change to trainee status.
- Moved to Georgia in Jan. 2001 for additional flight training with al-Shehhi.
- Left U.S. and returned from Madrid on July 19, 2001 and given permission to stay until November 2, 2001.
- Also lived in Hollywood and Coral Springs, Fla.
- Received change of status approval by INS in September a year after the attacks.
- Satam al-Suqami (25) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained business visa in Saudi Arabia (but was residing in United Arab Emirates).
- Entered U.S. in May 2001. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, asked for and was admitted for 20 days and was in overstay status at the time of the attacks. The Commission staff also said his passport was doctored (presumably with pages removed to hide his travel to countries where he obtained terrorist training).
- Was the only terrorist who did not have a U.S. ID to board the plane and used his passport.
- Was in overstay status at the time of the attack.
- Waleed al-Shehri (or Alshehri) (21) — Saudi Arabian (brother of Wail)
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Entered U.S. in May 2000.
- Licensed pilot.
- Lived in Hollywood, Orlando and Daytona Beach (all in Florida).
- In illegal nonimmigrant status (visa overstay) at time of the attack.
- Had a Florida driver’s license.
- Wail (or Wael) al-Shehri (or Alshehri) (25) — Saudi Arabian (brother of Waleed)
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Lived in Hollywood, Fla. and Newton, Mass.
- Had a Florida ID card.
- Abdulaziz al-Omari (or Alomari) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia in June 2001.
- According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, his passport was doctored (presumably with pages removed to hide his travel to countries where he obtained terrorist training).
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Lived in Hollywood, Fla.
- Had a Florida and Virginia driver’s licenses.
The WTC South Tower Plane (UA Flight 175, Boston to Los Angeles)
- Marwan al-Shehhi (or Alshehhi) — United Arab Emirates — pilot
- Studied electrical engineering at Tech. Univ. in Hamburg.
- In January 2000, obtained 10-year, multiple entry tourist visa in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
- Entered the U.S. in May 2000, applied September for change of status to student.
- Attended flight school in Florida, obtained FAA pilot’s certificate.
- Took at least 3 trips out of U.S. and back. (Overstayed entry permit as of Nov. 2000, left U.S. in Dec. 2000, returned Jan. 2001.)
- Attended flight school in Georgia with Atta in Jan. 2001. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, was sent to secondary inspection, but was admitted.)
- Flew to Egypt April 8, 2001, returned from Morocco May 2, 2001.
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Lived in New York City area, Georgia and moved to Hollywood, Fla. in July with Atta and trained at Huffman Aviation in Venice.
- Had a Florida driver’s license.
- Fayez Ahmed Rashid Ahmed al-Qadi Banihammad (aka Fayez Ahmed) — United Arab Emirates
- Obtained tourist visa in United Arab Emirates.
- Entered U.S. in June.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Ahmed al-Ghamdi (or Alghamdi) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Entered U.S. in May.
- In illegal visa overstay status at the time of the attack.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Had a Florida ID card.
- Had a Virginia driver’s license.
- Hamza Saleh al-Ghamdi (or Alghamdi) (20) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Had a Florida driver’s license.
- Mohand al-Shehri (or Alshehri) — Saudi Arabian
- Identity in doubt.
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Admitted to U.S. in May.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
The Pennsylvania Plane (UA Flight 93, Newark to San Francisco)
- Ziad Samir Jarrah — Lebanese — pilot
- Born in Lebanon in 1975.
- Studied aircraft construction and maintenance at Hamburg tech. univ. 1996-00.
- Obtained five-year, multiple-entry tourist visa in Germany.
- Entered U.S. in June 27, 2000 at Atlanta.
- Trained as a pilot in Venice, Florida and Virginia Gardens, Florida but never obtained student trainee visa. Received FAA pilot’s certificate.
- Took at least 5 trips out of U.S. and back (flew to Germany July 25 and returned August 5, 2001).
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Had a Florida driver’s license.
- Saeed al-Ghamdi (or Alghamdi) — Saudi Arabian
- Identity in doubt.
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, application falsely stated he had not previously applied for a U.S. visa.
- Entered U.S. in June 2001. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, he was sent to secondary inspection, because he had a one-way ticket and $500, but was admitted.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Had a Florida ID card.
- Ahmed Ibrahim A. al-Haznawi (or Alhaznawi) (21) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Entered the U.S. in June 2001. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, his passport may have had “suspicious indicators.”
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Had a Florida driver’s license.
- Ahmed Abdullah al-Nami (or Alnami) (23) — Saudi Arabian
- Obtained tourist visa in Saudi Arabia.
- Entered the U.S. in May 2001. According to the 2/04 Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, his passport may have had “suspicious indicators.”
- In legal nonimmigrant status at the time of the attack.
- Lived in Delray Beach, Fla.
- Had a Florida ID card.
Other Conspiritors:
- Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (Coordinator) — Indicted in 1996 in N. Y. for his role in an earlier terrorist plot. Had a Saudi Arabian passport (although not a Saudi national) — obtained a U.S. visa in July 2001.
- Ramzi Bin-al-shibh — Yemeni (potential pilot) — denied visa four times.
- Zakariya Essabar — Moroccan — potential pilot/hijacker — denied visa.
- Saeed “Jihad” al Gamdi — Potential hijacker — denied visa.
- Ali Abdul Aziz Ali — Pakistani — financial facilitator — denied visa.
- Mohamed al Kahtani — potential hijacker — denied visa.
http://www.fairus.org/issue/identity-and-immigration-status-of-9-11-terrorists
Part 3
Bill Clinton, his staff and other government resources were distracted by his sexual escapades, coverups and legal wrangling.
From just July 1998, before the Impeachment.
“July 1998
July 1, 1998: Linda Tripp makes her second appearance before the grand jury, during which the Lewinsky tapes may have been played.
July 7, 1998: Linda Tripp returns for her third day of testimony before the grand jury, as the Maryland state’s attorney opens investigations into Tripp’s taping of her conversations with Monica Lewinsky. The investigation is aimed at deciding whether Tripp had broken Maryland state laws that require both parties in a conversation to consent to be taped.
July 7, 1998: The U.S. Court of Appeals rules that Secret Service agents must testify before the grand jury, upholding Judge Norma Holloway Johnson’s earlier decision.
July 9, 1998: Monica Lewinsky announces she is prepared to cooperate in the Maryland investigation into the legality of Linda Tripp’s tapes of phone conversations as Tripp appears before the grand jury for the fourth time.
July 14, 1998: Ken Starr subpoenas Larry Cockell, head of the president’s security detail. The Justice Department, backed by the Secret Service, requests a full panel appeal of the Secret Service testimony decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals.
July 17, 1998: Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist denies an extension of the temporary stay on Secret Service testimony. The subpoenaed Secret Service agents appeared before the grand jury, although only three of them testify. Larry Cockell, who is not one of the agents to testify, spends the afternoon waiting.
July 21, 1998: The U.S. Court of Appeals holds a hearing on alleged leaks of grand jury information to the media by Ken Starr’s office. The hearings center on Judge Norma Holloway Johnson’s secret sanctions against Starr and his subsequent appeal. The sanctions would require Starr to turn over documents and other evidence related to the alleged leaks.
July 25, 1998: Word emerges that Independent Counsel Ken Starr has served President Clinton with a subpoena that calls for his testimony before the Lewinsky grand jury next week. Negotiations are underway on the scope, timing and format of Clinton’s testimony.
July 27, 1998: The U.S. Court of Appeals rules that attorney-client privilege does not protect presidential confidant Bruce Lindsey from answering all questions put to him before the Lewinsky grand jury.
July 28, 1998: In a dramatic breakthrough, lawyers for Lewinsky and Starr work out a full immunity agreement covering both Lewinsky and her parents, Marcia Lewis and Dr. Bernard Lewinsky.
July 29, 1998: President Bill Clinton agrees to testify voluntarily and Starr’s office withdraws the subpoena. Clinton’s testimony is set for August 17 at the White House.
July 30, 1998: Sources say that as part of her immunity agreement, Lewinsky has handed over to prosecutors a dark blue dress that she alleges may contain physical evidence of a sexual relationship with President Bill Clinton. The dress is turned over to the FBI lab for testing.”
http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/clintontimeline.htm
Once again, this was only one month.
The tip of the iceberg.
Bill Clinton, his staff and the government was consumed by this!
They were distracted from their duties.
The nation and the world suffered for Bill Clinton’s self absorption.
This is not an opinion.
It is fact!
More here:
https://citizenwells.com/
http://citizenwells.net/
Citizen WElls 