Obama crony crime in Chicago Cook County causes cramping in criminal courts and correction houses, US v Cook County IL, 1:10-cv-02946, Jail conditions violate Eighth Amendment
“79.6 percent of Chicago homicide victims to date in 2013 were black”…Citizen Wells July 20, 2013
“The misery index for blacks in Chicago and Illinois is not only exacerbated by the high unemployment, but also the high crime rates and jail overcrowding.”…Citizen Wells
“Because Cook County, like so much of Illinois local government and the state government as well, is operating deep in the red (its deficit is expected to be $400 million this year), considerations of cost loom large in any analysis of alternatives to a prisoner release order.”…USA v Cook County case 1:10-cv-02946
Obama, et al.
Masters of diversions.
They speak of the plight of young blacks like Trayvon Martin. Yet they are a huge part of the problem.
For example, Illinois has the second highest unemployment rate in the country at 9.2 percent.
As of a few days ago, 79.6 percent of Chicago homicide victims were black.
Much of the crime in Chicago is black on black.
From the courtroom of Judge Virginia Kendall ( you remember Judge Kendall, the presiding judge in FDIC v Mutual Bank, Amrish Mahajan, et al, you know, the bank that loaned Rita Rezko the money for the Rezko Obama lot transaction, you know, the bank that fired whistleblower Kenneth J. Conner ).
“Tuesday, July 30, 2013 (As of 07/27/13 at 06:45:41 AM )
Honorable Virginia M. Kendall Courtroom 2319 (VMK)
1:10-cv-02946 United States of America v. Cook Cou 09:00 Notice of Motion”
“Opinion of Three‐Judge District Court PER CURIAM.
The Sheriff of Cook County, who is the administrator of the Cook County Jail, has moved in this case for the entry of a prisoner release order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Since at least 1974 the jail has been a target of litiga‐tion claiming that conditions in the jail violate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause (which has been held applicable to state and local government by interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) in the case of convicted criminals, or, in the case of pretrial detain‐ees‐‐the major part of the jail’s population—the due process clause directly; but the courts “apply the same legal standards to deliberate indifference claims brought under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Minix v. Canarecci , 597 F.3d 824, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2010); see City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital , 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). Consent orders in this long‐running litigation have included prisoner release provisions premised on the belief that the jail’s chronic overcrowding was con‐tributing to the constitutional violations.”
“We further, and crucially, find that overcrowding is a primary cause of un‐constitutional conditions at the jail. Those conditions, which include as noted ear‐lier resort to excessive force by guards, grossly unsanitary and unhealthy condi‐tions, and grossly inadequate medical (including mental‐health) care, might well exist, to an extent, even if the jail were not overcrowded (hence the need for the Agreed Order). But we interpret the statute as authorizing a prisoner release or‐der if overcrowding is a primary cause of unconstitutional violations beyond what would exist without overcrowding. Cf. Hutto v. Finney , 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (“the order [a 30‐day limitation on sentences to punitive isolation] is supported by the interdependence of the conditions producing the violation. The vandal‐ized cells and the atmosphere of violence were attributable, in part , to over‐crowding and to deep‐seated enmities growing out of months of constant daily friction”) (emphasis added).”
“Because Cook County, like so much of Illinois local government and the state government as well, is operating deep in the red (its deficit is expected to be $400 million this year), considerations of cost loom large in any analysis of alternatives to a pris‐oner release order.”