Flynn Writ of Mandamus denied by US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia August 31, 2020, “we trust and expect the District Court to
proceed with appropriate dispatch”
“Instead of doing so, the government has continued to defy its
constitutional, ethical and legal obligations to this Court and to the defense, and to hide evidence that it knows exonerates Mr. Flynn. As is the essence of the problem here, instead of protecting its citizens, the “government” is protecting its own criminal conduct and operatives.”…Attorney Sidney Powell October
“Ms. Sines’s testimony flatly contradicts the FBI’s claims that (1) it did not investigate matters pertaining to Mr. Rich; (2) it did not examine his computer; and (3) it conducted a “reasonable” search but could not locate any records or communications about Mr. Rich. Specifically, Ms. Sines’s testimony flatly contradicts the affidavit testimony of FBI Section Chief David M. Hardy.”…Attorney Ty Clevenger March 29, 2020
“her client was “totally set up” because he threatened to expose wrongdoing by top intelligence officials in the Obama administration.
“He was going to audit the intel agencies because he knew about the billions Brennan and company were running off the books,” Powell said, referring to former CIA Director John Brennan.”…Sidney Powell, Vickie McKenna Show
From the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia August 31, 2020.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a writ of
mandamus is denied. As the underlying criminal case resumes in the District Court, we trust and expect the District Court to proceed with appropriate dispatch.”
“KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, with whom
RAO, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting: The Court today denies
Michael Flynn’s mandamus petition on the ground that he has
an adequate remedy at law. It also declines to reassign this case
to a different trial judge. I dissent as to the majority’s merits
holding for the reasons stated in the majority opinion in In re
Flynn, 961 F.3d 1215, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2020), vacated, reh’g
en banc granted No. 20-5143, 2020 WL 4355389 (D.C. Cir.
July 30, 2020); further, I join Judge Rao’s dissent herein. As
to the majority’s decision not to reassign, my colleagues set an
impossibly high bar for a trial judge’s impartiality to
“reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), and seem
content to read that subsection out of the United States Code,
even as they infuse Rule 48(a)’s “with leave of court” clause
with enough force to upend our entire system of separated
powers. Because I believe the trial judge’s conduct patently
draws his impartiality into question—and because I believe
§ 455(a) has teeth—I dissent and write separately to explain
why the trial judge is disqualified from further participation in
this case.”
“RAO, Circuit Judge, with whom HENDERSON, Circuit
Judge, joins, dissenting: The Department of Justice has moved
to dismiss the criminal charges against General Michael Flynn,
but the district court insists on further factfinding to scrutinize
the motives and circumstances behind the Department’s
decision. While a district court plays a limited role in granting
“leave of court” to an unopposed motion to dismiss, it is long
settled that a district court cannot supervise the prosecutorial
decisions of the Executive Branch. In our system of separated
powers, the government may deprive a person of his liberty
only upon the action of all three branches: Congress must pass
a law criminalizing the activity; the Executive must determine
that prosecution is in the public interest; and the Judiciary,
independent of the political branches, must adjudicate the case.
The Constitution divides these powers in order to protect
individual liberty from a concentration of government
authority.
In Flynn’s case, the prosecution no longer has a prosecutor.
Yet the case continues with district court proceedings aimed at
uncovering the internal deliberations of the Department. The
majority gestures at the potential harms of such a judicial
intrusion into the Executive Branch, but takes a wait-and-see
approach, hoping and hinting that the district judge will not
take the actions he clearly states he will take. While mandamus
remains an extraordinary remedy, it is appropriate here to
prevent this judicial usurpation of the executive power and to
correct the district court’s abuse of discretion. I respectfully
dissent.”
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